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I.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals of Utah, Arnold v.
Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58, 180 P.3d 188, filed February 28, 2008, reversing the trial court's
summary judgment order in favor of David Grigsby, M.D. Therefore, the Utah Supreme
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supreme Court has
appellate jurisdiction over "a judgment of the Court of Appeals").
II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented is whether Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (recently recodified as
78B-3-404) is subject to tolling under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (recently recodified as
78B-2-104). l Although the trial court found "that Plaintiffs discovered the alleged injury no
later than November 1999, which discovery started the running of the two-year statute of
limitations, per Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4," and that w*the statute of limitations for this
action against Dr. Grigsby began running more than two years prior to Plaintiffs filing their
complaint on December 04, 2001," the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary
judgment in favor of Dr. Grigsby, holding that wwthe tolling statute, section 78-12-35, applies
to medical malpractice claims otherwise governed by the Malpractice Act", and "the tolling

'Defendant/Appellant notes that the legislature has recodified Title 78, a change
that went into effect on February 7, 2008. Because the renumbering does not change the
analysis below, and because any substantive changes do not apply to this analysis,
Defendant/Appellant will cite to the version of Title 78 that was cited by the parties in
their briefs and in the Court of Appeals' opinion. See Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, n. 2.
-1-

statute suspends the running of the statute of limitations during the time a defendant is
absent from the state." Arnold v. Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58, \ 24.
As both the application of a statute of limitations and the interpretation of statutory
provisions present questions of law, the standard of review is one of correctness. See
Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^ 18, 108 P.3d 741 ("The applicability
of a statute of limitations . . . [is a] question[] of law, which we review for correctness/")
(quoting Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, ^ 32, 44 P.3d 742); Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ^ 5,
162 P.3d 1099 ("This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, a question of law that
we review for correctness/') On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of
the Court of Appeals of Utah, not the trial court. John Holmes Constr., Inc. v. R.A. McKell
Excavating, Inc., 2005 UT 83, f 6, 131 P.3d 199 ("On certiorari, we review the decision of
the court of appeals, not the trial court/') As the decision of the Court of Appeals of Utah
rests on questions of statutory interpretation, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the Court of
Appeals' decision for correctness, affording no deference to the Court of Appeals' legal
conclusions. Fla. Asset Fin. Corp. v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2006 UT 58, ^1 8, 147 P.3d 1189
("As the decision of the court of appeals rests on questions of statutory interpretation, we
review it for correctness, affording no deference to the court of appeals' legal conclusions.")
The issues were preserved below in the memoranda filed by the Defendant/Appellant.
R. 15-30,31-33, 143-151, 154-157, 177-198, 233-260, 335-370, 371-381, and 382-405.

-?.

III.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations are
determinative or important to the resolution of this appeal.
1.

United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3. Power of Congress

to regulate commerce.
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. Effect of absence from state.
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out
of the state, the action may be commenced within the term as
limited by this chapter after his return to the state. If after a
cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of his
absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of
the action.

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36. Effect of disability.
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery
of real property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either
under the age of majority or mentally incompetent and without a
legal guardian, the time of the disability is not a part of the time
limited for the commencement of the action.

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations - Purpose

of act.
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims
for damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from
health care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these
increases the insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of
-3-

medical malpractice insurance The effect of increased insuiance
premiums and increased claims is increased health care cost, both
through the health care providers passing the cost of premiums to the
patient and through the provider's practicing defensive medicine
because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a lawsuit
Furthei, certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing
to provide services because of the high cost and possible unavailability
of malpractice insurance
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the
adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's health
caie system, it is necessary to piotect the public interest by enacting
measures designed to encourage private insurance companies to
continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance while at the
same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of
insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from private
companies
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to piovide a
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health
care provideis while limiting that time to a specific penod foi which
professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and
accurately calculated, and to provide other pioceduial changes to
expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims
5

Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4 Statute of hmitations-Exceptions-Apphcation
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provide! may be bi ought
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff oi patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury, whichever fust occuis
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless
of minority oi other legal disability undei Section 78-12-36 oi any othei
provision of the law, and shall apply letroactively to all persons,
partnerships, associations and corpoiations and to all health care
pioviders and to all malpiactice actions against health caie pio\ ideis
based upon alleged personal injuries which occuired pnoi to the
effective date of this act, provided, howevei, that any action w Inch
under former law could have been commenced after the effectn e date
of this act may be commenced only withm the unelapsed portion of
time allowed under formei law, but any action which undei foimei law
-4-

could have been commenced more than four years after the effective
date of this act may be commenced only within four years after the
effective date of this act.
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal was brought challenging the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Utah,
which reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Defendant/Appellant
David Grigsby, M.D. (hereinafter "Dr. Grigsby"). Dr. Grigsby moved for summary
judgment against Plaintiffs/Appellees Gina M. Arnold and Charlie S. Arnold (hereinafter
the "Arnolds") regarding their medical malpractice claim against him because the statute of
limitations, set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
(the "Act"), had run against Dr. Grigsby. R. 576-84.
Following briefing by the parties, the trial court on November 21, 2005, and
December 20, 2005, entered its orders granting Dr. Grigsby" s motion for summary
judgment. R. 853-60, 871-73. In reaching its decision, the trial court determined that the
tolling statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35, did not apply. R. 853-54, 904-05. Although the
trial court rejected Defendant/Appellant's argument that the tolling statute did not apply to
medical malpractice cases, the trial court nevertheless determined that because Dr. Grigsby
could have been served in accordance with Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-27-24 to -25, the tolling statute did not work to suspend the running of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act's two-year limitations period, even though Dr. Grigsby was
absent from Utah as he had moved to Tennessee to practice medicine in that state. R. 853-

-5-

54, 904-05 In gi anting the motion for summary judgment, the tnal court found "that
Plaintiffs discovered the alleged injury no later than November 1999, which discoveiy
started the running of the two-year statute of limitations, per Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4,"
and that "the statute of limitations for this action against Dr Grigsby began lunning moie
than two years prioi to Plaintiffs filing their complaint on December 04, 2001 " R 853-54,
904-05 The court also found that "the plaintiffs' claim against Dr Grigsby is time-barred
on its face " R 859
The Arnolds appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals of Utah The
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Dr Gugsby,
holding that "the tolling statute, section 78-12-35, applies to medical malpractice claims
otherwise governed by the Malpiactice Act

the tolling statute suspends the miming of

the statute of limitations during the time a defendant is absent from the state v Arnold \
G//gs6>,208UTApp58 lj 24
The Utah Supieme Court granted the Defendant/Appellant's Petition foi Writ of
Certioian to determine whether Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4, the Utah Health Caie
Malpractice Acf s statute of limitations, is subject to the general tolling statute, Utah Code
Ann §78-12-35
V.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The follow ing tacts are relevant to the issues presented to this Court for review
1

The Arnolds filed their complaint on December 4, 2001, bringing a medical

-6-

malpractice action against Dr. Grigsby and others, which action arose from the care
provided to Mrs. Arnold on July 22, 1999, and alleged, "The procedure and other care
provided to Gina Arnold by Dr. White and/or Dr. Grigsby were perfomied in a negligent
manner. As a result, her colon was perforated and she was otherwise injured." R. 3.
2.

The Arnolds further alleged in their complaint, ^Commencing on July 23,

1999, and continuing thereafter, Gina Arnold was a patient of Dr. White's and/or
Dr. Grigsby" s at UBMC [Uintah Basin Medical Center] for the purposes of treating the
symptoms and injuries resulting from the perforation of her bowel and the resulting
infection. The care provided to her by Dr. White and/or Dr. Grigsby was performed in a
negligent manner." R. 3.
3.

Mrs. Arnold was initially discharged from Uintah Basin Medical Center on

July 27, 1999, and the Discharge Summary dated July 27, 1999, identifies Dr. Grigsby by
name, providing, "Tt was Dr. Grigsby's opinion that the air should have stayed there for
three or four days before it finally dissipated." R. 793.
4.

Mrs. Arnold was readmitted to Uintah Basin Medical Center and the medical

record, including the Operative Report dated August 3, 1999, clearly identifies that
Dr. Grigsby was actively involved in the August 3, 1999, surgery. R.795.
5.

The medical record contains a consultation report concerning Mrs. Arnold

from Dr. Grigsby dated August 5, 1999. R. 797-98.
6.

Dr. Grigsby perfomied another surgery on Mrs. Arnold on August 11, 1999, as

indicated in the Operative Report dated August 11, 1999. R. 800.

-7-

7.

The Arnolds both testified in their depositions that they were aware that

Dr. Grigsby was involved in Mrs. Arnold's treatment while she was still at Uintah Basin
Medical Center prior to her being transferred to St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City on
August 16, 1999. R. 804-07, 812-13.
8.

Dr. Grigsby testified that he had a number of conversations with the plaintiffs

during the time Mrs. Arnold was at Uintah Basin Medical Center. R. 816-20.
9.

Mrs. Arnold testified that in September, 1999, she consulted an attorney

because she suspected something had gone wrong with her care between July 22, 1999, and
August 16, 1999, stating, "I just knew something hadn't happened right." R. 808-09.
10.

By September 28, 1999, Mrs. Arnold was represented by counsel, at which

time she signed before a notary public her Authorization for and Request for Release of
Medical Information to her attorney, Harold A. Hintze. R. 828.
11.

By letter from her attorney dated November 16, 1999, Mrs. Arnold was aware

of "complications arising from an initial diagnosis and treatment of her for an intestinal
condition" and asserted that "complications following the initial treatment of Mrs. Arnold
rendered her totally incapacitated and prohibited her from maintaining gainful employment."
By that date, Mrs. Arnold, through her attorney, had begun an investigation into possible
medical malpractice claims as indicated in her attorney's letter to Uintah Basin Medical
Center that "this office investigates the possibility of claims that may be filed in relation to
her initial diagnosis and/or treatment." R. 825-26.
12.

Dr. Grigsby moved from Roosevelt, Utah, in July, 2000, to practice medicine

-8-

in Oneida, Tennessee R 735, 815, 855
13

Dr Grigsby was not served with a notice of intent to commence action as

requned by Utah Code Ann § 78-14-8, and no request for a prehtigation panel review as
required by Utah Code Ann § 78-14-12 was made until March 18, 2004 R 580
14

After the Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed naming Dr Grigsby on December 4,

2001, and following briefing by the parties and oral argument, on November 21, 2005, and
December 20, 2005, the trial court entered its orders granting Dr Grigsby's motion foi
summary judgment R 853-60, 871-73 In reaching its decision, the trial court determined
that the tolling statute, Utah Code Ann § 78-12-35, did not apply R 853-54, 904-05
Although the trial court rejected Defendant/Appellant's argument that the tolling statute did
not apply to medical malpiactice cases, the trial court nevertheless determined that because
Dr Grigsby could have been served in accordance with Utah's long-ami statute, Utah Code
Ann §§ 78-27-24 to -25, the tolling statute did not work to suspend the mnnmg of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act's two-yeai limitations period, even though Di Grigsby was
absent from Utah as he had mov ed to Tennessee to piactice medicine in that state R 85354, 904-05 In granting the motion for summary judgment, the trial court found "that
Plaintiffs discovered the alleged mjuiy no later than November 1999, which discoveiy
started the running of the two-yeai statute of limitations, pei Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4,"
and that "the statute of limitations for this action against Dr Grigsby began running more
than two yeais pnor to Plaintifts filing their complaint on December 04, 2001 " R 853-54,
904-05 The trial court also found that "the plaintiffs' claim against Di Gngsby is

-9-

time-barred on its face

R 859

15

The Arnolds filed a Notice of Appeal on May 22, 2006 R 907-909

16

Following bnefing by the parties and oral argument, the Court of Appeals of

Utah, on Februaiy 28, 2008, filed its judgment reversing the trial court's summary judgment
order in favor of David Grigsby, M D Arnold \ Grigsby 2008 UT App 58, ^f 24 The Utah
Court of Appeals held that the tolling statute, section 78-12-35, applies to medical
malpractice claims otherwise governed by the Malpiactice Act

the tolling statute

suspends the running of the statute of limitations during the time a defendant is absent fiom
the state " Id
17

Dr Gugsby filed a Petition foi Wnt of Certioian with the Utah Supieme

Court on March 24, 2008
18

In an Oidei enteied lune 13, 2008, the Utah Supreme Court gianted

Dr Grigsby's Petition for Writ of Certioran as to the i^sue of [wjhethei Utah Code Ann
§ 78-14-4 (recently recodified as 78B-3-404) is subject to tolling under Utah Code Ann
§ 78-12-35 (recently recodified as 78B-2-104) "
VI.
SUMMARY OF \RGUMENT
The Arnolds' medical malpractice action arises out ot the care piovided to
Mrs Arnold by Di Gugsby and others at the Uintah Basin Medical Centei between July 22
1999, and August 16, 1999 R 1-4 Because this is a medical malpractice action, it is
governed by the Utah Health Caie Malpractice Act (the Act ), Utah Code Ann § 78-14-1

-10-

et seq. The legislature expressly specified that the purpose of the Act is to provide a fixed
time to bring malpractice claims: wTn enacting this act [Utah Health Care Malpractice Act],
it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be
commenced against health care providers while limiting that time to a specific period for
which professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately
calculated." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. To achieve this purpose, with regard to the
abbreviated statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, the legislature specified,
"The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other
legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the law." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-4(2). (Emphasis added.)
The trial court, the Utah Court of Appeals, the federal district court for Utah, and the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals have each interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) to have
a different meaning in reaching different conclusions, indicating the ambiguity of this
statute. Given the ambiguity of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2), the statute should be
interpreted as to harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and
purpose expressly stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. Given the legislature's expressly
stated putpose for the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2, the
statutory language indicating that the fixed statute of limitations for medical malpractice
claims shall apply to all persons regardless of any other provision of the law clearly
harmonizes with the legislative intent and purpose of the Act. Therefore, medical
malpractice actions must be brought within two years regardless of other tolling provisions.

-11-

By specific legislative mandate, the commencing of a medical action must *wbe
brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 01
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury," and is not
subject to geneial tolling provisions because "[t]he provisions of this section shall apply to
all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any
other pro\ ision of the law " Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4 (Emphasis added ) Thus, geneial
tolling piovisions, including Section 78-12-35, do not apply to the Arnolds' medical
malpractice claim against Di Grigsby Therefore, the Arnolds' failure to timely commence
their medical malpractice action against Dr Grigsby within two yeais after they knew oi
should ha\e known of a possible injury is not cured by the application of any tolling statute
outside the specific mandates of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
Despite having discovered the alleged injury and suspecting negligence no latei than
Novembei 1999 (and actually even earlier when they encountered an attorney in Septembei,
1999), the Arnolds disregaided the requirements of the Act concerning Di Grigsby by filing
their complaint on December 4, 2001- more than two years after the statute of limitations
had begun to run R 853-54, 904-05 Based on established principles of statutory
interpretation, the Arnolds' "claim against Di Grigsby is time-baned on its face " R 859

-12-

VIL
ARGUMENT
I.
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DR. GRIGSBYS
ABSENCE FROM UTAH TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BECAUSE
THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT'S STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS IS SUBJECT TO TOLLING UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-35.
The Court of Appeals of Utah held that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's
two-year statute of limitations, set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4, was subject to the
general statutory tolling provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. Arnold v. Grigs by,
208 UT App 58, 180 P.3d 188. Although the trial court found "that Plaintiffs discovered the
alleged injury no later than November 1999, which discovery started the running of the
two-year statute of limitations, per Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4" and that "the statute of
limitations for this action against Dr. Grigsby began running more than two years prior to
Plaintiffs filing their complaint on December 04, 2001," the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's summary judgment in favor of Dr. Grigsby, holding that "the tolling statute,
section 78-12-35, applies to medical malpractice claims otherwise governed by the
Malpractice A c t . . . the tolling statute suspends the running of the statute of limitations
during the time a defendant is absent from the state." Arnold w Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58, ^j
24.
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated, "When we interpret statutes, our primary goal
is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to

-13-

achieve " Evans v State, 963 P 2d 177, 185 (Utah 1998) The Evans court went on to point
out
We therefoie look first to the statute's plain language We need not look
beyond its plain language unless we find some ambiguity m it Statutory
language is ambiguous if it can reasonably be understood to have moie
than one meaning
Id (Citations omitted ) The issue is whethei subsection (2) of Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4
overrides the tolling of the statute of limitations found in the general statutory tolling
provision of Utah Code Ann § 78-12-35

1

The tnal court, the Utah Court of Appeals, the

federal district court for Utah, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals have each interpieted
the meaning of subsection (2) of Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4 differently in determining this
issue See Arnold v Grigsby, 208 UT App 58 180 P 3d 188, Gnffiths-Rast \ Sulzei Spoine
Tech Inc , 2005 WL 223765 (D Utah) attached as Exhibit A, and Gi ifftths-Rast \ Suiza
Spoine Tech Inc , 2007 U S App LEXIS 3607 (10th Cir ) attached as Exhibit B Theietoie,
the statutory language of Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4 is cleaily ambiguous as it has been
undei stood by these four courts to ha\ e more than one meaning
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 Is Clearly Ambiguous \ s the Statute Has Been
Understood B\ Four Ditfeient Courts To Have More Than One Meaning.

Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4(1) provides that medical malpiactice actions must be
biought within two years of the discoveiy of the injury

' Utah Code Ann § 78-12-35 provides Where a cause of action accrues against a
person when he is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the teim as
limited by this chapter after his return to the state If aftei a cause of action accrues he
departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited foi the
commencement of the action *
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(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury, whichever first occurs . . . .
Subsection (1) is plain and unambiguous. However, the following subsection, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-4(2), is not plain but is ambiguous as it "can reasonably be understood to have
more than one meaning." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). Utah Code Ann.
§78-14-4(2) provides:
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless
of minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other
provision of the law . . . .
A review of the courts' holdings in Arnold v. Grigsby and Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spoine
Tech, Inc. demonstrates the ambiguity of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2).
Although both the Utah Court of Appeals and the trial court determined that the
statutory language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (2) did not exempt medical malpractice
actions from tolling statutes, each court did so by interpreting the statutory provision
differently. The trial court's analysis and the Utah Court of Appeals review of Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-4(2) reveal that this subsection is susceptible to multiple meanings. The Utah
Court of Appeals stated:
In its summary judgment order, the trial court determined that section
78-14-4(2) did not exempt medical malpractice actions from the reach of
the tolling statute. It astutely analyzed the issue as follows:
[I|t is clear to the Court that the language 'or any
other provision of the law' refers only to other
provisions of the law which define 'legal disability/
This reading is supported by the fact that this language is
contained within a dependent clause which refers back to,
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and clarifies the meaning of, the term wall persons ' The
clause 'regardless of minonty or other legal disability
undei Section 78-12-36 or any other piovision of [the]
law' is contained within a single set of commas, indicating
to this Court that the legislature intended the clause to
lefer to party status, rathei than to removing this piovision
from the scope of all other pro\ lsions of law Theiefore,
the Court rejects Defendant's aigument on this point
We agree with this structural interpretation of the provision and
conclude that the phrase 4or any other provision of the law' onl\
refers to other provisions of law relating to 'minority or other legal
disabilities]' that might otherwise affect the limitations period
Arnold v Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58, ^ 14, 180 P 3d 188 (Emphasis added ) The
highlighted sections of the Court of Appeals' conclusion clearly indicates that Utah Code
Ann § 78-14-4(2) is susceptible to multiple meanings
Fust, the tnal court determined that "it is cleai to the Court that the language 'oi any
other provision of the law * refers only to other piovisions of the law which define 'legal
disability ' Id (Emphasis added ) In other words, according to the trial court, the phiase "oi
any other pio\ lsion of law" only refers to 'legal disability "
Howevei, the Court ot Appeals determined that "the phrase woi any othei pio\ ision of
the law' only refeis to othei piovisions of law relating to 'minority or othei legal
disabilities] "" Id (Emphasis added ) In othei words, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the phrase "or any other piovision of law" lefers to both "minority oi other legal disability "
There foie, both the tual court and the Court ot Appeals have undei stood Utah Code Ami
§ 78-14-4(2) to ha\e moie than one meaning even if then interpretations of this subsection
led to the same conclusion
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Similarly, in Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spoine Tech, Inc., 2005 WL 223765 (D. Utah),
attached as Exhibit A, the federal district court for the district of Utah understood Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-4(2) to have a meaning different than either the trial court's or the Utah Court
of Appeals' interpretation of the statute's meaning, which led the federal district court to a
different conclusion. In that case, the plaintiff sought to avoid summary judgment on the
running of the statute of limitations by asserting that Section 78-12-35 had tolled the
two-year statute of limitations set forth in Section 78-14-4 from the time the defendant
physician had moved away from the state of Utah. However, the federal district court
rejected the plaintiffs arguments, finding that "section 78-12-35 is inapplicable to toll the
statute of limitation." Id. at 4. The federal district court specified:
The Malpractice Act specifically provides that its two-year
limitations period "shall apply to all persons, regardless of
minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any
other provision of the law. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2).
As the Utah Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]he Utah
Legislature has demonstrated that if it seeks specifically to
exempt a statute from the tolling statute, it will do so with clear,
explicit language." Bonneville Asphalt v. Labor Comm 'n, 91 P.3d
849, 852 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). Because the Malpractice Act
provides an explicit exception to section 78-12-35 by
requiring the two-year statute of limitations to apply to "all
persons," section 78-12-35 does not apply in medical
malpractice cases. Thus, Ms. Griffiths-Rast's claim against
Dr. Prasad was not tolled.
Id. (Emphasis added.) In other words, the federal district court concluded that the Medical
Malpractice Act's statute of limitations is exempt from the tolling statute because the
two-year statute of limitations specifically applies to "all persons."
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the federal district court's conclusion
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that Section 78-12-35 does not apply in medical malpractice cases, although with a different
emphasis on Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2):
The district court held that medical malpractice actions were
excepted from the tolling provision of § 78-12-35 because under
§ 78-14-4(2) the two-year limitation period "shall apply to all
persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability under
Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the lawT (emphasis
added). The court held that this provision was an "explicit
exception to section 78-12-35" and that the limitation period was
not toiled during Dr. Prasad's absences. We agree.
Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spoine Tech, Inc., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3607 (10lh Cir.), attached
as Exhibit B (emphasis in original.) The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals highlighted that the
two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions applies to all persons
regardless of "any other provision of law."
In summary, these four different courts determined three different formulations of
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2): the phrase "or any other provision of the law" can be read to
(1) modify the term "legal disability"; or (2) modify the phrase "minority or legal disability";
or (3) act as a catch-all phrase. Therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) is clearly
ambiguous as it can reasonably be understood to have more than one meaning.
B.

Because Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) Is Ambiguous, the Statutory
Provisions Must Be Harmonized With the Legislative Purpose to Alleviate
Health Care Costs Via the Establishment of a Fixed Window of Time in
Which Actions May Be Commenced Against Health Care Providers.

Four different courts have found four different meanings to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-4(2), which have led to two different conclusions as to whether all medical
malpractice actions are excluded from the general tolling statute, Utah Code Ann.
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§ 78-12-35. Once again, the Utah Supreme Court has pointed out, "Statutory language is
ambiguous if it can reasonably be understood to have more than one meaning." Evans v.
State, 963 P.2d 177, 185 (Utah 1998). Clearly, the statutory language of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-4(2) is ambiguous. Therefore, an analysis beyond the "plain language" of the statute
is required.
The Utah Supreme Court has clarified that when a statute is ambiguous, then an
analysis of the act in its entirety is required to harmonize its provisions in accordance with
the legislative intent and purpose. The Evans court indicated:
However, if we find a provision ambiguous, which causes doubt or
uncertainty as to its meaning or application, we must analyze the act in
its entirety and '"harmonize its provisions in accordance with the
legislative intent and purpose.'"
Id. An analysis of the legislative intent and purpose of the Medical Malpractice Act clearly
indicates that the legislature intended to fix the two-year statute of limitations for all persons*
medical malpractice actions regardless of any other provision of the law, including the
general tolling provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35.
Fortunately, Utah's legislature clearly indicated the intent and purpose within the
Medical Malpractice Act itself. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "we ha[ve] no
need to speculate as to what purposes the Malpractice Act was intended to serve because the
purposes were set forth in § 78-14-2." Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993). (See
also Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P.2d 30, 31-32 (Utah 1981) ("The avowed
legislative purpose for treating the class of health providers differently from other defendants
is stated in the Act itself") Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 provides:
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The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for
damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from
health care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these
increases the insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of
medical malpractice insurance. The effect of increased insurance
premiums and increased claims is increased health care cost, both
through the health care providers passing the cost of premiums to the
patient and through the provider's practicing defensive medicine
because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a lawsuit. Further,
certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing to provide
services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of
malpractice insurance.
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the
adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's health
care system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting
measures designed to encourage private insurance companies to
continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance while at the
same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of
insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from private
companies.
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health
care providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which
professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and
accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural changes to
expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (emphasis added). The clear intent is to treat medical malpractice
claims different from other claims. In the medical malpractice context, the abbreviated
two-year statute of limitations applies regardless of any other provision of the law, including
general tolling statutes.
The Utah Court of Appeals' decision failed to recognize the legislature's clearly
expressed intent in enacting the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was to limit the time for
bringing a malpractice action to a specific period of time. However, the Utah Supreme Court
-20-

has often discussed the legislature's clearly expressed intent to limit the time for bringing a
malpractice action to a specific period of time as articulated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. In
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Or., Inc., 2003 UT 23, ^ 30, 70 P.3d 904, the Utah
Supreme Court noted:
According to its own provisions, the purpose of the UHCMA is
to %*provide a reasonable time in which actions may be
commenced against health care providers while limiting that time
to a specific period for which professional liability insurance
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated." Id.
§ 78-14-2.
In Dowling v. Bullen, the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that the puipose of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act is to ease health care costs by establishing a specific window of
time to bring malpractice actions:
However, the stated puipose of the UHCMA is to alleviate health care
costs via the establishment of a fixed window of time "in which actions
may be commenced against health care providers[,] while limiting that
time to a specific period for which professional liability insurance
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated."
Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 5 0 4 11, 94 P.3d 915. Given that the stated puipose of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act is "to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be
commenced against health care providers while limiting that time to a specific period for
which professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately
calculated," the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) that clearly harmonizes its
provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose is where the two-year
limitation period "shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability
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under Section 78-12-36 01 any other provision of the law" including Utah Code Ann
§78-12-35
Instead of attempting to harmonize the piovisions of Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4(2) in
accordance with the legislative intent and puipose as articulated in Utah Code Ann
§ 78-14-2, the Utah Court of Appeals simply referenced the legislative histoiy of Utah Code
Ann § 78-14-4(2) The Utah Court of Appeals claimed that "the legislative histoiy supports
om interpretation ot section 78-14-4(2) " Arnold \ Gngsby, 2008 UT App 58, \ 15, 180
P 3d 188 Howevei, the Utah Supreme Court also analyzed the legislate e histoiy of Utah
Code Ann § 78-14-4(2) in Blum v Stone, 752 P 2d 898 (Utah 1988) The Blum court
determined
In 1979, the legislature responded to Scott and its progeny by amending
section 78-14-4 See 1979 Utah Laws ch 128, § 1 The amendment
evinced the legislature's determination to apply the medical malpiactice
statute of limitations to all plaintiffs' claims, including those of
minois J Section 78-14-4(2) thereafter stated "The provisions of this
section shall apply to all persons, legaidless of minonty or other legal
disability undet $ 78-12-36 oi an\ othei piowsion of law
"
Id at 900 (Emphasis added ) The Utah Supieme Court has clearly indicated that the
legislative history ''evinced the legislatuie's deteimination to apply the medical malpiactice
statute of limitations to all plaintiffs' claims

Id (Emphasis added ) Theiefoie, the

legislative histoiy of Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4(2) moie closely paiallels the fedeial district

'Defendant Appellants are awaie that the Utah Supreme Court determined in Lee
v Gaufin, 867 P 2d 572 (Utah 1983), that Utah Code Ami *> 78-14-4(2) is
unconstitutional as applied to minots Howev eu that decision does not apply to the
present case as it is clear that the Utah Supieme Court confined the unconstitutionality of
Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4(2) only to those citcumstances when a minor has been injured,
which circumstances aie not piesent in the pending mattei
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court's determination in Grifjiths-Rast:
Because the Malpractice Act provides an explicit exception to section
78-12-35 by requiring the two-year statute of limitations to apply to
"all persons/' section 78-12-35 does not apply in medical malpractice
cases.
Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spoine Tech, Inc., 2005 WL 223765 (D. Utah), attached as
Exhibit A.
C.

The Court of Appeals' Claim that Its Interpretation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-4(2) is Not Contrary to the Legislative Purpose of the Act
Because Dr. Grigsby Could Have Merely Appointed an Agent to Receive
Service of Process Has Been Rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court as an
Unreasonable Burden on Interstate Commerce.

Instead of attempting to harmonize the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2)
in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose as articulated in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-2, the Utah Court of Appeals merely concluded "that our interpretation of section
78-14-4(2) is not contrary to the purpose of the act." Arnold v. Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58,
^| 19, 180 P.3d 188. Not being contrary is not the same as attempting to harmonize
provisions with the legislative intent and purpose.
The Utah Court of Appeals went on to claim its interpretation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-4(2) was not contrary to the purpose of the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act
because:
it still substantially limits the statute of limitations period for
malpractice actions and still provides the needed predictability for
insurance companies in the vast majority of cases. . . . As the Arnolds
argue, and as indicated in section II of this opinion, all medical
providers need do to make sure the statute of limitations is not
tolled if they leave Utah is appoint an agent within Utah to receive
service of process for them.
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Arnold v. Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58, \ 19, 180 P.3d 188. (Emphasis added.) Despite the
Utah Court of Appeals' claim that its interpretation of section 78-14-4(2) will not affect
interstate commerce because Dr. Grigsby merely needed to appoint an agent within Utah to
receive service of process for him to toll the statute of limitations, the United States
Supreme Court has rejected such claims in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises,
Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988), and its progeny.
The United States Supreme Court determined that Ohio's tolling statute was
unconstitutional as applied to out-of-state corporations that did not have an agent
designated for service of process in Ohio. Id. at 894. The Court pointed out:
The suggestion that Midwesco had the simple alternatives of
designating an agent for service of process in its contract with Bendix
or tendering an agency appointment to the Ohio Secretary of State is
not persuasive. . . . As we have already concluded, this exaction is an
unreasonable burden on commerce.
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 894-895 (U.S. 1988).
Although the facts in Bendix dealt with an out-of-state corporation, courts have extended
the ruling of Bendix to individuals, such as Dr. Grigsby.
For example, in the case of Tesar v. Hallas, 738 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Ohio 1990), the
court applied Bendix to a statute of limitations tolling claim involving a defendant who had
moved from Ohio to Pennsylvania to take a new job. The court determined:
If the events in question here involve an "out-of-state person[] . . .
engaged in commerce,'' id., then this Court must undertake an analysis
like the one set forth in Bendix . . . . The threshold question is whether
Hallas can be deemed, in commerce clause terms, to be or to have
been "engaged in commerce." Unlike the corporation in Bendix,
Hallas is not alleged to have been engaged in a business causing him
-24-

frequently to ship goods or to travel himself interstate Instead, the
complaint simply states that he lived and worked in Cleveland foi the
Plain Dealer, and then he moved to Pennsylvania and began a new job
there The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue two and
a half score yeais ago, and held that *wthe movement of persons falls
within
the Commerce Clause " Edwards \ California, 314 U S
160, 172, 86L Ed 119, 62 S Ct 164(1941) Courts since then ha\ e
follow ed suit, holding that interstate commerce is affected when
peisons move between states in the course of or in search for
employment
Following Bendix's holding that requiring foieign
corporations to submit to the geneial jurisdiction of Ohio courts "is an
unreasonable burden on commerce," it seems plainly "unreasonable"
foi persons who have committed acts they know might be consideied
tortious to be held hostage until the applicable limitations penod
expires Peisons in that position, or businesses desirous of hiring
them, would be burdened to a gieater degree than Benda's foieign
corporations, because Ohio has no piocedure that permits a person
who wishes to move out-of-state to register with the state foi seivice
purposes
Tesarv Hallas,738F

Supp 240, 241-242 (N D Ohio 1990) Similarly,

Defendant/Appellant is unaware of a statutory procedure in Utah that permits a person who
wishes to move out-of-state to register with the state for sei\ice purposes The Tesai couit
held that the tolling statute did not apply to the defendant since he moved to anothei state
foi employment Id at 242 Similarly, it is undisputed that Dr Grigsby moved horn Utah
to Tennessee to practice medicine there, which similarly affects interstate commeice
D.

The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2)
Would Negatively Impact Commerce and Is Contrary to the Legislative
Purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.

In addition, the Utah Court of Appeals claims that its mterpietation of section
78-14-4(2) is not contiaiy to the purpose of the act because "oui mteipietation should not
cause malpiactice insuiance lates to increase and will not detet healthcare provideis from
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leaving Utah." Arnold v. Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58, ^ 19, 180 P.3d 188. In other words,
the Utah Court of Appeals claims that its interpretation of section 78-14-4(2) will not affect
commerce, including interstate commerce. However, the Utah Court of Appeals does not
provide anything substantial to back up its claim. Instead, other courts have held that
similar applications of a tolling statute impact commerce negatively. See Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988) and Mcfadden v. Battifora, 2004
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 595, 14-15 (Cal. App. 2dDist. 2004) discussed below.
The Utah Supreme Court has pointed out that one of the purposes of enacting the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was to control the rising costs of health care: "The Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act was enacted in 1976 to control the rising cost of medical
malpractice insurance." Plans v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997).
The legislature clearly set forth and codified the intent of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act, which is to address the commercial impact of health care malpractice claims in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-2. Exempting health care malpractice actions from the tolling statute's
general application is in keeping with the legislative intent of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act. However, failing to do so is inconsistent with the legislative intent and by
extending the two-year statute of limitations logically increases the length of exposure of
malpractice actions and cannot help but increase insurance rates.
In addition, applying this interpretation and exempting health care malpractice
actions from the tolling statute's general application is in keeping with the United States
Supreme Court's holding on the impact of the Commerce Clause on tolling statutes. Under

-26-

the Supreme Court's holding in Bendix Auto lite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., and
its progeny, absences from a jurisdiction for purposes of interstate commerce may not
constitutionally stop the running of a period of limitations in that jurisdiction. Bendix
Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988).
In a medical malpractice case involving a tolling statute and a physician who move
to another state to practice medicine, Mcfadden v. Battifora, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
595, 14-15 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2004), the court held that because "Dr. Medeiros, a former
California resident, moved to Texas to take a new job in 1998, thereby engaging in
interstate commerce. . . . Under Bendix, section 351 [California's tolling statute] cannot be
used to toll the otherwise applicable statute of limitations."4 Similarly, Dr. Grigsby moved
to Tennessee to take a new job in 2000, thereby engaging in interstate commerce and
affording him the protections of the Commerce Clause.
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Bendix, and its progeny, is consistent
with the legislative intent of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, which clearly addresses
the commercial impact of health care malpractice claims. The Utah Supreme Court has
stated, "we have "a duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to effectuate
legislative intent and avoid and/or save it from constitutional conflicts or infirmities/"
State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). This Court should construe the statutory
phrase, "or any other provision of law," so as to avoid a conflict with the Commerce Clause
and to harmonize the stated purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
4

A copy of the Mcfadden v. Battifora opinion is attached in the addendum as
Exhibit C.
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and to harmonize the stated purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
VIII.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant/Appellant Dr. Grigsby respectfully
requests that the Utah Supreme Court reverse the judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals
and detennine that Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 is not subject to tolling under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-35 and uphold the summary judgment of the trial court.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t hisi s £ i T a a y of July, 2008.
BURBIDGE & WHITE, LLC

Larry R/White

Daniel R. Harper
Attorneys for David Grigsby, M.D.
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TECH, INC., a Minnesota Corporation; and PRAVEEN PRASAD, M.D.,
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CENTRAL DIVISION
2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 46290
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September 14,2005, Filed
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v. Sulzer Spine Tech, 216 Fed Appx. 790, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3607 (10th Cir., 2007)
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[*1] Valerie Ann Griffiths-Rast, an
individual, Plaintiff, Pro se, SALT LAKE CITY, UT.
For Valerie Ann Griffiths-Rast, an individual, Plaintiff:
D. Bruce Oliver, LEAD ATTORNEY, SALT LAKE
CITY, UT.
For Sulzer Spine Tech, a Minnesota Corporation, also
known as Zimmer Spine, Defendant: Rick L. Rose,
LEAD ATTORNEY, Kristine M. Larsen, RAY
QUINNEY & NEBEKER (SLC), SALT LAKE CITY,
UT; Andrea Michelle Roberts, Thomas G. Stayton,
BAKER & DANIELS (IND), INDIANAPOLIS, IN.
For Praveen G. Prasad, an individual, Defendant:
Christian W. Nelson, LEAD ATTORNEY, P. Keith
Nelson, LEAD ATTORNEY, Brandon B. Hobbs,
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON, SALT
LAKE CITY, UT.
JUDGES: DALE A. KIMBALL, United States District
Judge.
OPINION BY: DALE A. KIMBALL
OPINION
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendants'
motions for summary judgment on the grounds that
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the applicable statutes of
limitation. A hearing on the motions was held on
September 8, 2005. At the hearing, Plaintiff Valerie Ann
Griffiths-Rast ("Ms. Griffiths-Rast") was represented by

D. Bruce Oliver. Defendant Praveen Prasad, M.D. ('Dr.
Prasad") was represented by Brandon Hobbs, and
Defendant Sulzer Spine Tech, Inc. ("Sulzer Spine") [*2]
1
was represented by Andrea Roberts. Before the hearing,
the court carefiilly considered the memoranda and other
materials submitted by the parties. Since taking the
motions under advisement, the court has further
considered the law and facts relating to the motions. Now
being fully advised, the court enters the following
Memorandum Decision and Order.
1 Sulzer Spine refers to itself in its memoranda
as "Zimmer Spine, Inc." However, for purposes
of this Memorandum Decision and Order, it will
be referred to as "Sulzer Spine."
I. BACKGROUND
The court finds that the following facts are
undisputed. Ms. Griffiths-Rast sustained a back injury at
work in February 1997. She was referred to Dr. Prasad
by her Worker's Compensation carrier. In August 1997,
after reviewing Ms. Griffiths-Rast's MRI scan, Dr.
Prasad originally recommended physical therapy;
however, during a follow-up visit on March 19, 1998, Dr.
Prasad suggested that she undergo a surgical procedure,
the BAK Cage implantation, to address her ongoing back
pain. The BAK Cage is an interbody fusion device
manufactured by Sulzer Spine. Ms. Griffiths-Rast stated
that prior to her March 19 visit with Dr. Prasad, she was
doing better in physical [*3] therapy and able to lift
seventy pounds, but she still had residual pain after
physical therapy. She also indicated that Dr. Prasad told
her with the surgery she had a ninety-five percent chance
of going back to work after a six month healing process.
Dr. Prasad performed the surgery on August 3, 1998.
Prior to surgery, Ms. Griffiths-Rast signed a consent
form that authorized Dr. Prasad to perform the surgery,
and it identified the name of device to be implanted in
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her spine. Following the surgery, Ms. Griffiths-Rast
experienced complications and remained in the hospital
for twelve days.

II. DISCUSSION

During her deposition, Ms. Griffiths-Rast indicated
that she was aware of a problem with the BAK Cage
implantation immediately after the surgery during her
hospital recovery. When asked if she "felt like there was
a problem with the cage implantation" and "with what
Dr. Prasad did," she answered affirmatively and further
testified that "[e]verything went wrong." She also
indicated that she attributed the pain she experienced
after surgery "to something Dr. Prasad did or didn't do
during the procedure" or "to some problem with the . . .
cage device." Ms. Griffiths-Rast stated that she retained
counsel [*4] a couple of weeks after her surgery "[w]hen
[she] wasn't getting any better."

A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate when
the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. The movant bears an initial burden to
demonstrate an absence of evidence to support an
essential element of the non-movant's case. If the movant
carries [*6] this initial burden, the burden then shifts to
the non-movant to make a showing sufficient to establish
that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
existence of that element. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 US. 317, 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265
(1986).

On November 10, 1998, Ms. Griffiths-Rast received
an SI injection from a doctor at Parkview Radiology who
informed her that "there was a healing defect on the left
side of [the] cage." Ms. Griffiths-Rast admits in her
response to Dr. Prasad's motion for summary judgment
that the earliest point where she could reasonably be
aware of medical malpractice was during this visit to
Parkview Radiology.
On November 26, 2001, Dr. Prasad was deposed in a
case against another patient. During that deposition, Dr.
Prasad indicated that he had moved out of Utah in
September 2000. Dr. Prasad also intimated that while he
was on Sulzer Spine's advisory board from 1998 to 2000,
he may have periodically been out of the state teaching
the BAK Cage procedure to his peers around the country.
Also on November 26, 2001, Ms. Griffiths-Rast
served Dr. Prasad a Notice of Intent to Commence
Action ("Notice") as required by the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (2002)
("No malpractice action against a health care provider
may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the
prospective defendant or his [*5] executor or successor,
at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence
an action."). Ms. Griffiths-Rast further claims that she
did not discover the name of the manufacturer of the
BAK Cage until a meeting with Dr. Prasad on October 4,
2002.
On November 26, 2002, a year after serving Dr.
Prasad Notice, Ms. Griffiths-Rast filed a complaint
against both Dr. Prasad and Sulzer Spine alleging
medical malpractice and products liability respectively.
On January 30, 2003, Ms. Griffiths-Rast filed an
amended complaint to include certain factual allegations
but her claims against both Dr. Prasad and Sulzer Spine
remained the same. However, she did not serve Sulzer
Spine with the amended complaint until February 11,
2004.

1. Standard of Review

The non-movant "must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d
538 (1986). While the non-movant is entitled to the
benefit of whatever reasonable inferences there are in its
favor, the reasonableness of those inferences is
scrutinized in light of the undisputed facts. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US. 242, 256, 106 S. Ct. 2505,
91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A genuine dispute exists only if
"the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248. "By its very terms, this standard provides that the
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between
the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there is no genuine issue of material
fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in
original).
2. Dr. Prasad's Motion
Dr. Prasad argues [*7] that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's
claims against him are barred by the Utah Healthcare
Malpractice Act ('"Malpractice Act") which provides that
"[n]o malpractice action against a health care provider
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use
of reasonable diligence should have discovered the
injury, whichever occurs first." Utah Code Ann. § 78-144(1) (2002). The discovery of a legal injury occurs "when
the injured person knew or should have known of an
injury and that the injury was caused by a negligent act."
Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, 984 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah
1999). Furthermore, '"[discovery of a legal injury,
therefore, encompasses both awareness of physical injury
and knowledge that the injury is or may be attributable
to negligence.'" Id. (quoting Chapman v. Primary
Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1989)).
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Because Ms. Griffiths-Rast served Dr. Prasad with
Notice on November 26, 2001, she must have necessarily
discovered her legal injury on or after November 26,
1999 in order to pursue her claim. However, Dr. Prasad
asserts that at Ms. Griffiths-Rast's deposition she
admitted to discovering her injury immediately [*8] after
surgery, which was on August 3, 1998, and thus well
before November 26, 1999. Dr. Prasad further asserts
that the latest possible date on which Ms. Griffiths-Rast
discovered or should have discovered her legal injury
was November 10, 1998 when a doctor at Parkview
Radiology informed her of a "healing defect on the left
side of [the] cage." Accordingly, Dr. Prasad concludes
that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's claims are barred by the
Malpractice Act's statute of limitations whether her cause
of action accrued in August 1998 or in November 1998
because she served Notice well after the limitations
period expired for either date.
Ms. Griffiths-Rast concedes that the earliest she
could have discovered her legal injury was November 10,
1998. However, she argues that Dr. Prasad's absence
from Utah in September 2000 and his periodic absences
between 1998 and 2000 tolled the two-year statute of
limitations under Utah Code section 78-12-35. This
statute provides:
Where a cause of action accrues against
a person when he is out of the state, the
action may be commenced within the term
as limited by this chapter after his return
to the state. If after a cause of action
accrues he departs from the state, [*9] the
time of his absence is not part of the time
limited for the commencement of the
action.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. Ms. Griffiths-Rast
concludes that the time between September 2000, when
Dr. Prasad left Utah, and November 26, 2001, when he
was served with Notice, should not be computed against
her. She also requests further discovery pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) in order to
establish other periods of time Dr. Prasad was absent
from Utah during 1998 to 2000.
However, the court agrees with Dr. Prasad's
argument that section 78-12-35 is inapplicable to toll the
statute of limitations. The Malpractice Act specifically
provides that its two-year limitations period "shall apply
to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal
disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision
of the law . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2). As the
Utah Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]he Utah
Legislature has demonstrated that if it seeks specifically
to exempt a statute from the tolling statute, it will do so

with clear, explicit language." Bonneville Asphalt v.
Labor Comm'n, 91 P.3d 849, 852, 2004 UT App 137
(Utah Ct. App. 2004). Because the Malpractice Act
provides an explicit exception [*10] to section 78-12-35
by requiring the two year statute of limitations to apply
to "all persons," section 78-12-35 does not apply in
medical malpractice cases. 2 Thus, Ms. Griffiths-Rast's
claim against Dr. Prasad was not tolled. Therefore,
whether Ms. Griffiths-Rast discovered or should have
discovered her legal injury in August 1998 or November
10, 1998 is immaterial because both dates are well before
the date she served Dr. Prasad Notice on November 26,
1999. Accordingly, Dr. Prasad's motion for summary
judgment is granted.
2 However, the Utah Supreme Court in Lee v.
Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993), held that
section 78-14-4(2) is unconstitutional as applied
to minors because they have no standing to
commence a lawsuit before they reach majority.
See id. at 579. That reasoning is not applicable in
the instant case because Ms. Griffiths-Rast was
not a minor when her cause of action accrued.
3. Sulzer Spine's Motion
Sulzer Spine asserts that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's claims
are barred by the Utah Product Liability Act's ("UPLA")
statute of limitations, which provides that a plaintiff must
commence a product liability claim within two years of
the date that plaintiff "discovered, or in the exercise
[*11] of due diligence should have discovered, both the
harm and its cause." Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3. The
harm is the physical injury or illness suffered by the
plaintiff as a result of the defendant's conduct. McKinnon
v. Tambrands, Inc., 815 F. Supp 415, 418 (D. Utah
1993). In Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d
250 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals
interpreted the phrase "and its cause" to mean that the
limitations period did not begin to run "until the plaintiff
discovers, or in the exercise of due diligence should have
discovered, the identity of the manufacturer." Id. at 253.
The court "reasoned that lacking such information, a
plaintiff could not know the cause of his or her injury."
Bank One Utah, N.A. v. West Jordan City, 54 P. 3d 135,
2002 UT App 271 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (discussing
Aragon and distinguishing the differences between the
Malpractice Act's statute of limitations and the UPLA's
statute of limitations). Relying on this language from
Aragon, Ms. Griffiths-Rast asserts that her products
liability claim against Sulzer Spine was tolled by her
inability to discover the identity of the BAK Cage
manufacturer prior to her meeting with Dr. Prasad on
October 4,2002.
"Generally, [*12] the question of when a plaintiff
knew, or with reasonable diligence should have known,
of a cause of action is a question of fact for the jury."
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McCollin v. Synthes Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1123 (D.
Utah 1999). However, this determination can be made as
a matter of law when the evidence is such that no issue of
material fact exists. Id. "What constitutes due diligence
'must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each case. It
is that diligence which is appropriate to accomplish the
end sought and which is reasonably calculated to do so.'"
Aragon, 857 P.2dat253 (citations omitted).
Ms. GrifTiths-Rast offers no evidence to suggest that
she made the required due diligence inquiry to determine
the manufacturer of the BAK Cage prior to meeting with
Dr. Prasad. She argues that an affidavit of her counsel's
paralegal, Jason Jensen, indicates that the nurse paralegal
he contracted with to research the claims against Dr.
Prasad provided internet literature for the LT-Cage rather
than the BAK Cage and that, because of this, they were
led to believe the LT-Cage was the device used.
However, this does not demonstrate "due diligence."
While Ms. Griffiths-Rast knew the name of the device
implanted [*13] in her spine prior to her surgery, and
she retained counsel to pursue her claim within a couple
of weeks of the surgery, neither she nor her counsel
undertook any effort to identify the BAK Cage
manufacturer prior to meeting with Dr. Prasad. "The
discovery rule does not allow plaintiffs to delay filing
suit until they have ascertained every last detail of their
claims." McCollin, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 1124', see also
McKinnon, 815 F. Supp. at 421. "All that is required [to
trigger the statute of limitations] is . . . sufficient
information to apprise [the plaintiffs of the underlying
cause of action] so as to put them on notice to make
further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions" about
the defendant's actions. McCollin, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 1124
(quoting United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park
City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah 1993)). [*14]
Because Ms. Griffiths-Rast had sufficient information
immediately after her surgery to put her on notice that
she may have a cause of action against the manufacturer
of the BAK Cage, and she did not exercise due diligence
in discovering the name of the manufacturer, her claim
against Sulzer-Spine was not tolled by her failure to
discover its identity.
Ms. Griffiths-Rast also asserts that her claim against
Sulzer Spine was tolled by its status as a foreign
corporation. Specifically, she contends that because

Sulzer Spine is a foreign corporation and, at the time of
Ms. Griffiths-Rast's surgery, did not have a registered
agent in Utah pursuant to Utah Code section 78-27-21, it
is not entitled to assert a statute of limitations defense.
However, the case cited by Ms. Griffiths-Rast to support
this assertion expressly rejected this argument. See
Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines Development Co., 72
Utah 137, 269 P. 147 (1928). The plaintiffs in Clawson
argued that because the defendant failed to comply with
Utah law authorizing foreign corporations to conduct
business in Utah, it was not entitled to use a statute of
limitations defense. Id. at 151. The Utah Supreme Court
rejected this argument [*15] and held that foreign
corporations may assert a statue of limitations defense
even if the corporation failed to register an agent or
otherwise comply with statutes governing foreign
corporations. Id. at 151-52. The court further stated that
under the applicable Utah statute, a foreign corporation is
only barred from "prosecuting or maintaining any action,
suit, counterclaim, or cross-complaint in any court of the
state. It does not prohibit such corporation from
defending an action brought against it." Id. at 152. The
court concluded that "[t]here is no condition tolling the
statute [of limitations] as to foreign corporations." Id.
Therefore, Sulzer Spine's status as a foreign corporation
did not toll the statute of limitations, and Ms. GriffithsRast's claim is untimely. Accordingly, Sulzer Spine's
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment [docket # 54 and docket # 58] are GRANTED.
Because there are no remaining claims against any
Defendants, this action is hereby DISMISSED.
DATED this 14th day of September, 2005.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Dale A. Kimball
DALE A. KIMBALL
United States District [*16] Judge
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HOLLOWAY,

OPINION BY: Bobby R. Baldock
OPINION
[*791]
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

and

*
After examining the briefs and appellate
record, this panel has determined unanimously
that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P.
34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir.
R.32.L
[**2] Plaintiff-appellant Valerie Ann Griffiths-Rast
appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to
defendants-appellees Sulzer Spine Tech (Sulzer) and
Praveen G. Prasad, M.D. Ms. Griffiths-Rast underwent a
back surgery on August 3, 1998, during which Dr. Prasad
implanted a "BAK Cage" manufactured by Sulzer into
Ms. Griffiths-Rast's spine. Ms. Griffiths-Rast
subsequently served Dr, Prasad with a notice of intent to
commence action on November 26, 2001, and filed her
complaint on November 26, 2002, alleging a violation by
Dr. Prasad, of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 through 78-14-16 (1998),
and a violation by Sulzer of the Utah Product Liability
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-15-1 through 78-15-6 (1998).
The district court granted summary judgment to Dr.
Prasad on the ground [*792] that the claim against him
was barred by the two-year statute of limitation found in
§ 78-14-4(1) and that the limitation period in that statute
was not tolled by application of 78-12-35. The district
court granted summary judgment to Sulzer on the ground
that the claim against it was barred by the two-year
statute of limitation [**3] found in § 78-15-3. Ms.
Griffiths-Rast appealed, and we exercise our jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C § 1291 and affirm.
A. Standard of Review
"We review the district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used
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by the district court." Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of
Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d
1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is
appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a summary judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). A statute of limitation defense is an affirmative
defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Where a defendant
seeks summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative
defense,
[t]he defendant . . . must demonstrate
that no disputed material fact exists
regarding the affirmative defense asserted.
If the defendant meets this initial burden,
the plaintiff must then demonstrate [**4]
with specificity the existence of a disputed
material fact. If the plaintiff fails to make
such a showing, the affirmative defense
bars his claim, and the defendant is then
entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law.

Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F3d 562, 564 (10th Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted).
B. Claim Against Dr. Prasad
Under §78-14-8:
No malpractice action against a health
care provider may be initiated unless and
until the plaintiff gives the prospective
defendant or his executor or successor, at
least ninety days' prior notice of intent to
commence an action.

Ms. Griffiths-Rast served Dr. Prasad a notice of intent to
commence action on November 26, 2001. The district
court granted Dr. Prasad summary judgment on the
ground that the two-year malpractice statute of limitation
barred Ms. Griffiths-Rast's claim because she should
have discovered her legal injury prior to November 26,
1999. It further held that the limitation period was not
tolled by any periods of time during which Dr. Prasad
was absent from the state of Utah. Ms. Griffiths-Rast
argues that the grant of summary judgment was improper
because a reasonable jury could [**5] have found (1)
that the two-year statute of limitation should not have
begun to run until July 2, 2001, the date she claims she
discovered her legal injury, and (2) that the limitation
period was tolled by § 78-12-35.
1. Discovery of Legal Injury

Under §78-14-4(1):
No malpractice action against a health
care provider may be brought unless it is
commenced within two years after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered the injury, whichever
first occurs, but not to exceed four years
after the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect or occurrence.

The two-year statute of limitation in this section begins
to run when "the injured person knew or should have
known that [she] had sustained an injury and that the
injury was caused by negligent action." Foil v. Ballinger,
601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979). "[Discovery of legal
injury, therefore, encompasses both awareness of
physical injury and knowledge that the injury is or may
be attributable to negligence." Collins v. Wilson, 1999
UT 56, 984 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1999) (quotation
omitted). "[A]ll that is [*793] required [**6] to trigger
the statute of limitations is sufficient information to put
plaintiff[] on notice to make further inquiry if [she]
harbors doubts or questions." Macris v. Sculptured
Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, 24 P.3d 984, 990 (Utah
2001).
Ms. Griffiths-Rast testified in her deposition that
"immediately after the [August 3, 1998, surgical]
procedure," while she was still in the hospital recovering,
she felt that there was a problem with the cage
implantation, and there was a problem with what Dr.
Prasad did, and that "[everything went wrong." Aplt.
App., Vol. 1 at 77-78, 80. Ms. Griffiths-Rast also
testified that she contacted a lawyer about the problems
with her back surgery "a couple of weeks after [her]
surgery" when she "wasn't getting any better," and that
she signed an agreement retaining the attorney's services
at that time. Id. at 104. Further, on November 10, 1998,
another doctor informed Ms. Griffiths-Rast that there
was a defect with the cage implantation. Id., Vol. 2 at
204-05, 210. Ms. Griffiths-Rast produced no evidence in
response to Dr. Prasad's summary judgment motion to
refute these facts, admitting that she had discovered
[**7] the malpractice in November 1998. See Aplt.
App., Vol. 2 at 210. l
1 The argument presented in her response was
that she discovered the malpractice in November
1998. &?e Aplt. App. at 210.
Nevertheless, Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues that she did
not discover her legal injury until July 2, 2001, when she
received a report from a Dr. Stephen Wood stating that
he had been told by the Utah Malpractice Insurance
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association that "there have been numerous malpractice
suits filed due to complications resulting from 'The Cage1
. . . [and that he] ha[d] been told that the procedure is no
longer recommended." Aplt. App. at 200. Ms. GriffithsRast argues that the determination of when she
discovered her legal injury is a factual question not
suitable for summary judgment.
Ms. Griffiths- Rast misinterprets the summary
judgment standard. The question is whether there is a
"genuine issue as to any material fact," Fed R. Civ. P.
56(c) (emphasis added), and "an issue of [**8] material
fact is genuine only if the nonmovant presents facts such
that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the
nonmovant," Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933,
935, 150 Fed. Appx. 819 (10th Cir. 2005). Here, no
reasonable jury could find that Ms. Griffiths-Rast did not
have sufficient information to put her on notice to
conduct a further inquiry into whether there was
malpractice until after November 26, 1999. In fact, she
admitted that she believed that there was something
wrong with Dr. Smith's performance immediately after
the August 1998 surgery and that she hired an attorney a
couple of weeks later to conduct an inquiry into possible
malpractice.
2. Tolling of Statute of Limitation
Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues in the alternative that even
if she was aware of her legal injury prior to November
26, 1999, the limitation period should have been tolled
for some of that time because (1) Dr. Prasad conducted
business outside of Utah for periods of time between her
surgery and September 2000, and (2) Dr. Prasad moved
from Utah to California in September 2000. Under § 7812-35:
Where a cause of action accrues against
a person when he is out of the state, the
action may [**9] be commenced within
the term as limited by this chapter after
his return to the state. If after a cause of
action accrues he departs from the state,
[*794] the time of his absence is not part
of the time limited for the commencement
of the action.
Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues that it is a disputed genuine
issue of fact whether Dr. Prasad was absent for enough
time so that tolling the statute of limitation for that period
of time would result in the statue not being violated. She
argues that the district court should have conducted a
separate trial to decide this issue.
The district court held that medical malpractice
actions were excepted from the tolling provision of § 7812-35 because under § 78-14-4(2) the two-year limitation
period "shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority

or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any
other provision of the law" (emphasis added). The court
held that this provision was an "explicit exception to
section 78-12-35" and that the limitation period was not
tolled during Dr. Prasad's absences. We agree.
Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues on appeal that the tolling
provision in § 78-12-35 is applicable despite the
language in § 78-14-4(2). [**10] She first directs us to
Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 333 n.3 (Utah
1997). In that footnote, the Utah Supreme Court noted
that the family of a woman who allegedly died of
malpractice argued that they should be able to file her
suit outside the two-year statute of limitation because
under §78-12-37:
[I]f a person entitled to bring an action
dies before the expiration of the time
limited for the commencement thereof,
and the cause of action survives, an action
may be commenced by [her]
representatives after the expiration of that
time and within one year from [her] death.

The Utah Supreme Court ruled against the family on the
ground that the statute of limitation had run prior to the
woman's death. Jensen therefore does not support Ms.
Griffiths-Rast's argument. A ruling that § 78-12-37 did
not apply because the limitation period expired prior to
the decedent's death, is not the same as ruling that § 7812-37 would have applied if the limitation period had not
expired. There is no indication that the court even
considered the effect of § 78-14-4(2) on § 78-12-37.
Ms. Griffiths-Rast also argues that the Utah Supreme
[**11]
Court found that § 78-14-4(2) was
unconstitutional as applied to minors. In Lee v. Gaufin,
867 P.2d 572, 580-81 (Utah 1993), the court found that §
78-14-4(2) created an exception to § 78-12-36, which
generally tolls limitation periods as to claims of minors
until the minor reaches the age of majority. Since Ms.
Griffiths-Rast's brief does no more than note that Lee
found § 78-14-4(2) unconstitutional in that it nullified §
78-12-36, we can only assume that she is asserting,
without argument, that it is also unconstitutional when
applied to nullify to § 78-12-35. We disagree.
The Utah Supreme Court's holding in Lee was
premised on the fact that, since minors had no legal
capacity to sue in Utah, application of § 78-14-4(2) in
some cases would result in the statute of limitation
running prior to the minor coming of age and being
legally able to bring his or her action. Lee, 867 P.2d at
580. Consequently, application of § 78-14-4(2) would
deprive some minors of access to the court system. Id.
Here, there is no such problem. Considering the
provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e), Utah R. Civ. P. 4
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[**12] , and Utah's long-arm statute, § 78-27-24, 2 it is
clear [*795] that a potential defendant's flight to another
state will not immunize him from suit. Dr. Prasad was
jiimself served with process after he moved to California.

suitable age and discretion there
residing, or by delivering a copy
of the summons and the complaint
to an agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive
service of process[.]

2 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e):
Unless otherwise provided by
federal law, service upon an
individual from whom a waiver
has not been obtained and filed . . .
may be effected in any judicial
district of the United States:
(1) pursuant to the law of the
state in which the district court is
located, or in which service is
effected, for the service of a
summons upon the defendant in an
action brought in the courts of
general jurisdiction of the State; or
(2) by delivering a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to
the individual personally or by
leaving copies thereof at the
individual's dwelling house or
usual place of abode with some
person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein or
by delivering a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to
an agent a u t h o r i z e d by
appointment or by law to receive
service of process.

Under the pertinent parts of Utah R. Civ. P.
4(d)(1):
(d)(1) Personal service. The
summons and complaint may be
served in any state or judicial
district of the United States . . . . If
the person to be served refuses to
accept a copy of the process,
service shall be sufficient if the
person serving the same shall state
the name of the process and offer
to deliver a copy thereof. Personal
service shall be made as follows:
(d)(1)(A) Upon any individual
. . . by delivering a copy of the
summons and the complaint to the
individual personally, or by
leaving a copy at the individual's
dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of

Under the pertinent parts of § 78-27-24:
Any person . . . whether or not a
citizen or resident of [Utah], who
in person or through an agent does
any of the following enumerated
acts, submits himself, and if an
i n d i v i d u a l , his
personal
representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of [Utah] as to any
claim arising out of or related to:
(1) the transaction of any
business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply
services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury
within this state whether tortious
or by breach of warranty;

[**13]
3 Ms. Griffiths-Rast also raises a brief argument
that under § 78-14-8 she was entitled to a 120-day
enlargement of the four-year limitation period
imposed by the statute of repose found in § 7814-4(1). This argument is meritless. First, the
district court held that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's action
was barred under the malpractice act's two-year
statute of limitation, not the four-year statute of
repose. Second, under § 78-14-8, a malpractice
action may not be commenced unless the
prospective defendant is given notice of the
plaintiffs intent to commence an action at least
ninety days prior to the filing of the suit. If the
notice is served "less than ninety days prior to the
expiration of the applicable time period, the time
for commencing the malpractice action against
the health care provider shall be extended to 120
days from the date of service of the notice." Id.
Ms. Griffiths-Rast served her notice of intent in
November of 2001. Ms. Griffiths-Rast admitted
that she discovered her legal injury in November
of 1998. Therefore, even if the date that she
admitted discovery is used, the two-year statute
of limitation period ran in November 2000, a year
prior to thefilingof her notice.
[** 14] C. Claim Against Sulzer
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Under § 78-15-3, a legal action under the Utah
Product Liability Act: "shall be brought within two years
from the time the individual who would be the claimant
in such action discovered, or in the exercise of due
diligence should have discovered, both the harm and its
cause." The Utah Court of Appeals has held that because
the statute of limitation in § 78-15-3 runs from the time
the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered both
the harm and its "cause," the reference to "cause" in that
section "tolls the running of the statute of limitation until
the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of due diligence
should have discovered, the identity of the
manufacturer." Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857
P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct App. 1993). Because Ms.
GrifTiths-Rast did not file her complaint until November
26, 2002, [*796] her claim is barred unless she did not
discover, or in the exercise of due diligence should not
have discovered, that the BAK Cage had injured her and
that Sulzer manufactured the BAK Cage until after
November 26, 2000.
Ms. GrifTiths-Rast testified that she felt as if there
was a problem with the cage implantation while [**15]
she was in the hospital immediately after her surgery on
August 3, 1998; that the BAK Cage hurt and "felt" like it
was "defective"; and that she had been able to feel that
the BAK Cage was defective since its implantation. Aplt.
App., Vol. 1 at 80-81, 101-02. Because all that is
required to start the running of the limitation period is
information sufficient to put the plaintiff on notice to
make further inquiry," Macris, 24 P.3d at 990, we don't
believe a reasonable jury could find that Ms. GriffithsRast should not have discovered with the exercise of due
diligence that the BAK Cage had injured her until after
November 26, 2000.
The more difficult question is whether, as a matter of
law, through the exercise of due diligence, she should
have discovered that Sulzer was the manufacturer of the
BAK Cage prior to November 26, 2000. The district
court correctly noted in another case that "[generally, the
question of when a plaintiff knew, or with reasonable
diligence should have known, of a cause of action is a
question of fact for the jury." McCollin v. Synthes Inc.,
50 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1123 (D. Utah 1999). As noted
above, however, the relevant [**16] question is whether
there is a "genuine issue as to any material fact," Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added), and "an issue of material
fact is genuine only if the nonmovant presents facts such
that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the
nonmovant," Garrison, 428 F.3d at 935. The district
court held that no reasonable jury could find that Ms.
Griffiths-Rast had exercised due diligence in discovering
that Sulzer was the manufacturer of the BAK Cage, and
that "her claim against Sulzer-Spine was not tolled by her
failure to discover its identity." Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 361.
On appeal, Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues again that she

did not discover that she had a legal injury until July 2,
2001, when Dr. Wood's letter told her about other
malpractice claims that had been raised. Once she
discovered that she had a legal injury, she "first
commenced the medical malpractice portion of her suit
before proceeding with the products liability aspect" of
her suit. Br. of Aplt. at 35. She alleges that she did not
begin her product liability case at the same time as her
medical malpractice case because "she needed
confirmation from [**17] Dr. Prasad [regarding] who
the manufacturer was." Id. She argues that given the
"fact" that she did not discover her legal injury until July
2, 2001, and that she did not discover that Sulzer
manufactured the BAK Cage until October 4, 2002, "[a]
reasonable jury [could] find . . . that she did not
reasonably discovery [sic] the name of the manufacturer
of the BAKTM Cage until October 2002." Br. of Aplt. at
39-40.
We disagree. As properly noted by the district court,
"[w]hat constitutes due diligence must be tailored to fit
the circumstances of each case. It is that diligence which
is appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which is
reasonably calculated to do so." Aragon, 857 P.2d at 253
(quotation omitted). It seems clear that in a normal case a
reasonable jury could not find that it would take over two
years to determine the manufacturer of a trademarked
medical device when the party knows the correct name of
that device. 4 [*797] The question then becomes
whether Ms. Griffiths-Rast presented evidence that
would allow a reasonable jury to find that even if she had
used "diligence which is appropriate to accomplish the
end sought and which is reasonably [**18] calculated to
do so," Aragon, 857 P.2d at 253, she should not have
ascertained the identity of the manufacturer prior to
November 26, 2000. She presented no such evidence.
4 Sulzer presented the consent form signed by
Mr. Griffiths-Rast showing that she was going to
have spinal fusion surgery with "BAK cages."
Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 332, 341. In Ms. GriffithsRast's appellate brief, she notes that one of the
"assumptions" that she had made, that Dr. Prasad
eventually corrected, was that the "BAK" in BAK
Cage was a typographical error for the word
"back." Br. of Aplt. at 35.
In fact, Ms. Griffiths-Rast presented the district
court with the affidavit of a paralegal that worked for her
attorney to help explain why it had taken four years to
determine the manufacturer of the BAK Cage. The
paralegal averred that the firm had contracted with an
outside "nurse paralegal" who "was employed to research
the claims against the doctor." Aplt. App. at 316.
According to the affiant, the nurse paralegal "provided
[**19] some internet literature" for a "LT-Cage," and
that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's attorney was "led to believe that
the LT-Cage was a recently approved Cage from the
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same manufacturer of the BAK Cage." Id. According to
Ms. Griffiths-Rast, she and her attorney went to the
October 2002 meeting with Dr. Prasad, "with literature
concerning a the [sic] LT-Cage product manufactured by
different [sic] company believing that was the product
implanted into her," and Dr. Prasad informed them that
they had the wrong device.
Consequently, the evidence presented to the district
court did not show that because of the circumstances of
the case a reasonable jury could have found that with the
exercise of due diligence she should not have discovered
that Sulzer manufactured the BAK Cage until after
November 26, 2000. It showed instead that because the
outside nurse paralegal led her attorney to the
misunderstanding that the "LT-Cage" and the BAK Cage
were made by the same company, she misidentified the
manufacturer and proceeded under that misidentification
until the October 2002 meeting with Dr. Prasad.
It is true that Ms. Griffiths-Rast noted in the district

court that Sulzer had gone through a [**20] number of
company name changes and was a foreign corporation
without a registered agent in Utah. She made no
argument, however, that these facts impeded her ability
to identify Sulzer as the manufacturer of the BAK Cage.
Consequently, we see no error in the district court's grant
of summary judgment on this issue.
D. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the district court's
grant of summary judgment to Dr. Prasad and Sulzer is
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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OPINION
Appellant Lorna McFadden appeals from a judgment
entered after a jury found that the statute of limitations
barred appellant's medical malpractice action against
respondents Hector Battifora, M D , and Jeffrey
Medeiros, M D We affirm
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Certain facts are not in dispute In May 1997,
appellant Lorna McFadden went to see her doctor, Tadao
Fujiwara, M D , to investigate a lump in her left breast
Dr Fujiwara ordered a mammogram and [*2] biopsy
After the biopsy, a nurse from Dr Fujrwara's office

1 There was a dispute of fact concerning the
location of the lump felt in 1999, and whether it
was in the same location as the lump felt in 1997
In February 2000, appellant contacted a lawyer The
complaint for medical malpractice was filed on
December 19, 2000, naming respondents, among others 2
It was proceeded [*3] by the '"Notice of Intent to
Commence Action" required by statute whenever suit is
brought against a health care provider (See Code Civ
Proc, § 364 subd (a)) The notice was served October
13,2000
2 Due to the truncated nature of the proceedings,
there is no evidence in the record explaining how
respondents were involved in appellant's medical
care Dr Medeiros is described in the briefs as a
former pathologist for the City of Hope who
diagnosed the tissue sample from the 1997 biopsy
as non-cancerous
Several defendants, including respondents herein,
sought a bifurcated trial on the statute of limitations as
permitted by Code of Civd Procedure section 597 5 '
Trial commenced on the statute of limitations defense
The only witness called was appellant herself After
hearing her testimony and reviewing certain medical

Page 2
2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 595, *
records introduced as exhibits, the jury answered the
following questions in the affirmative: "Did [appellant]
suspect, prior [*4] to October 13, 1999, that the alleged
misdiagnosis was caused by someone's wrongdoing?"
and "Would a reasonable person have suspected, prior to
October 13, 1999, that the alleged misdiagnosis was
caused by someone's wrongdoing?"
3
Section 597.5 provides that "in an action
against a physician" and other types of
professional health care providers "based upon
the person's alleged professional negligence" if a
statute of limitations defense is raised and either
party so moves, "the issues raised thereby must
be tried separately and before any other issues in
the case are tried."
Following the verdict, the parties briefed the issue of
whether the limitations statute should have been tolled
with respect to Dr. Medeiros due to his absence from the
state since May 1998, when he moved to Texas to take a
new job. The court ruled that there was no basis for
tolling, and judgment was entered in favor of respondents
on July 8,2002. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I
The parties agree that the governing [*5] statute of
limitations is found in Code of Civil Procedure section
340.5, which provides in relevant part: "In an action for
injury or death against a health care provider based upon
such person's alleged professional negligence, the time
for the commencement of action shall be three years after
the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers,
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first." As
explained in Kitzig v. Nordquist (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th
1384, 1391, this statute "sets forth two alternate tests for
triggering the limitations period: (1) a subjective test
requiring actual suspicion by the plaintiff that the injury
was caused by wrongdoing; and (2) an objective test
requiring a showing that a reasonable person would have
suspected the injury was caused by wrongdoing.
[Citation.] The first to occur under these two tests begins
the limitations period."
Appellant contends that the essence of the
underlying statute of limitations defense was that
appellant "should have known, sometime between
August 10 and October 13, 1999, that she was
misdiagnosed in 1997, because [*6] Dr. Fujiwara's nurse
told her in that year that she had cancer" and that
respondents' position "rests solely on the belief that the
nurse's comment ~ corrected by her physician hours later
— should have triggered a suspicion of wrongdoing two
years later." Selectively quoting from closing argument,
appellant implies that this fact was "the linchpin of

[respondents']
defense."

affirmative

[statute

of

limitations]

Appellant misperceives the evidence that supported
the jury's findings. The evidence demonstrated that
appellant went to see Dr. Fujiwara about a lump in her
left breast in May 1997. He ordered a mammogram and
biopsy and, having received the results and consulted
with other physicians, told her she did not have cancer.
Two years later, in the summer of 1999, a new doctor
diagnosed cancer in the same breast. Appellant
underwent a mastectomy in September 1999. That is the
point at which a reasonable person should have been
suspicious of the original diagnosis of no cancer. Yet
appellant did not submit the required statutory notice to
her health care providers until October 2000, more than a
year later.4
4 If the statutory notice is submitted within the
last 90 days of the limitations period, it extends or
tolls the statute for up to 90 days depending on
the precise day it was served within the
limitations period. (Code Civ. Proc, § 364, subd.
(d); Davis v. Marin (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 380,
385.)
[*7]
The significance of the call from Dr.
Fujiwara's nurse was not that it should have made
appellant immediately suspicious of her doctor's 1997
diagnosis. A patient is entitled to believe reassuring news
from her doctor or another physician. In Kitzig v.
Nordquist, supra, for example, the patient sought a
second medical opinion and was assured in 1994 that she
was being treated appropriately. She brought suit in
1996, within a year of being told by other physicians that
something was going wrong. The court held that she was
not obligated to bring suit within one year of her initial
suspicion since a patient should not be "placed in the
position of conducting a full investigation" to determine
whether litigation is appropriate after "the second doctor
confirms that the first doctor is doing everything right."
(81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393.)
To a similar effect is the decision in Artai v. Allen
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, discussed in appellant's
reply brief. There, appeal was taken from a judgment in
favor of defendant based on a statute of limitations
defense after the initial phase of a bifurcated nonjury
trial. The facts indicated that [*8] plaintiff awoke after
pelvic surgery in May 1998 with severe and persistent
throat pain. Plaintiff saw at least 20 specialists in the next
18 months and was given numerous conflicting
diagnoses. In May 1999, she stated on a medical form
that she believed her continuing pain was due to "some
sort of trauma [that was] caused during intubation [for
anesthesia during the surgery]." (Id. at p. 276, italics
omitted.) In November 1999, plaintiff underwent
exploratory surgery and was told that there was a fracture
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in her thyroid cartilage, but not that it was or may have
been caused by the intubation during the 1998 surgery.
Nevertheless, the diagnosis caused plaintiff to attribute
the fracture to the intubation. She filed her complaint
against the anesthesiologist on October 27, 2000. The
Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence did not
support the finding that plaintiff knew, or by reasonable
diligence should have known, that her throat pain was
caused by professional negligence until the 1999
exploratory surgery. The court noted that "[plaintiff] was
a model of diligence" in that "she consulted at least 20
specialists in the 18 months following the May 8, 1998,
surgery" [*9] and "was given some two dozen possible
diagnoses, including tonsil infection, cancer, lupus,
emotional and/or mental problems and asthma." (Id. at p.
281.) Because "the necessary facts could not be
ascertained without exploratory surgery" and diligence
did not require plaintiff to immediately resort to surgery,
the court could not agree that plaintiffs claim was
untimely. (Ibid.)
Appellant here admits that her suspicions of
negligence were aroused after the 1999 diagnosis of
cancer as soon as Dr. Fujiwara's diagnosis of no cancer
in the same breast crossed her mind. To support her
position that she did not have any misgivings prior to
February 2000, she testified that the earlier diagnosis was
driven from her head by the 1999 cancer diagnosis,
surgery, and followup chemotherapy treatments, and that
she "never thought about" the 1997 diagnosis until
February 2000 when she was "reminded" of it by a
friend. The nurse's call was significant because it cast
doubt on appellant's testimony that she did not think
about the 1997 diagnosis until February 2000. In
response to appellant's theory, counsel for respondents
argued in closing: "There are certain things in your [*10]
life that you never forget. Being told you have cancer,
thinking your are going to die, having the dark cloud
surround you as [appellant] talked about, having the light
shine back upon you, you never forget." Counsel further
pointed out that appellant had been able to provide the
doctors in Las Vegas with the names of her prior
physicians and releases so that they could obtain her
medical records, and told them about the prior biopsy.
On those facts, the jury was entitled to believe that
appellant was being untruthful when she claimed to have
forgotten the traumatic occasion on which she was
initially told she had breast cancer and then, a few hours
later, told she did not. Accordingly, the jury had ample
ground to believe that appellant's suspicion of
wrongdoing was or should have been aroused in the
summer of 1999, when she was diagnosed with cancer by
the Las Vegas doctors and suffered the removal of her
left breast.
II
The remaining issue has to do with tolling under

section 351 of the Code of Civil Procedure (section 351)
which provides in relevant part: "If, when the cause of
action accrues against a person, he is out of the State, the
action [*11] may be commenced within the term herein
limited, after his return to the State, and if, after the cause
of action accrues, he departs from the State, the time of
his absence is not part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action." 5 Because Dr. Medeiros
moved to Texas in May 1998, prior to the accrual of the
one-year statute of limitations, appellant maintains that
the statute has not run as to him.6
5 Despite its language, courts have held that a
defendant "need not 'enter' or 'return' to the state
in order for the plaintiff to commence an action
which takes advantage of the tolling provisions of
section 55/." (Green v. Zissis (1992) 5
Cal.App.4th 1219, 1223.) In 1979, the California
Supreme Court held that the modern availability
of alternate methods of service in place of
personal delivery of a summons and complaint,
such as substituted service and service by
publication, had no impact on section 35Ts
continued viability. (Dew v. Appleberry (1979) 23
Cal.3d630, 634-636, 153 Cal. Rptr. 219.)
6 Appellant devotes a considerable portion of
her brief to the issue of whether section 351 can
ever be applied to toll the one-year medical
malpractice limitations period due to a restriction
on tolling found in Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.5. Respondents concede that it can.
[*12] In Bendix Auto lite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enterprises (1988) 486 U.S. 888, 100 L. Ed. 2d 896, the
United States Supreme Court held that an Ohio tolling
statute similar to section 351 unnecessarily burdened
interstate commerce because it barred foreign
corporations from asserting a statute of limitations
defense unless they maintained a presence in Ohio, but
served no weighty state interest due to the fact that
Ohio's long-arm statute permitted service on foreign
corporations at any time. Bendix was applied to section
351 by the Ninth Circuit in Abramson v. Brownstein (9th
Cir. 1990) 897 F.2d 389, which involved a
Massachusetts resident who had entered into an
agreement with two California residents. The California
residents sued for breach of contract and fraud long after
the fact, and relied on section 351 to establish that
otherwise applicable statutes of limitations had been
tolled. The Ninth Circuit held that applying section 351
to the situation would impermissibly burden interstate
commerce, reasoning that "[section 351] forces a
nonresident individual engaged in interstate commerce to
choose between being present in California for several
[*13] years or forfeiture of the limitations defense,
remaining subject to suit in California in perpetuity." (Id.
at p. 392.)
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In Filet Menu, Inc. v. Cheng (1999) 71 Cal. App A th
1276, this court considered whether section 351 was
constitutionally sound when its provisions were applied
to a California resident engaged in interstate commerce.
In Filet Menu, California resident Warren Cheng was
sued for breach of contract and other related claims. The
complaint alleged that Cheng was absent from California
for periods sufficient to toll the running of the applicable
statutory period, but did not allege the specific reasons
for Cheng's out-of-state travel. We concluded that
''section 351 imposes a special burden on residents who
travel in the course of interstate commerce that is not
shared by residents involved solely in 'local business and
trade . . . .'" (Id. at p. 1282, quoting Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, supra, 486 U.S. at p.
891.) "Residents engaged in interstate commerce often
travel outside the state to facilitate this activity, unlike
residents who are otherwise occupied or employed. Thus,
section [*14] 351 poses a hard choice to residents who
engage in interstate commerce and who face potential
liability arising out of this economic activity that section
351 does not pose to other residents. Residents occupied
in interstate commerce must curtail their travel outside
the state in the course of interstate commerce to avoid the
tolling provisions of section 351, or endure extended
exposure to litigation because of their travel in the course
of interstate commerce." (Filet Menu, Inc. v. Cheng,
supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1283.) At the same time, we
found no state interest to outweigh this burden since
"residents are equally subject to service, regardless of
their reasons for traveling out of state." (Ibid.)
We found support for our conclusion in the case of
Tesar v. Hallas (N.D. Ohio 1990) 738 F. Supp. 240, in
which the court had held that "interstate commerce is
affected when persons move between states in the course
of or in search for employment" in applying Bendix to a

case involving a defendant who had moved from Ohio to
Pennsylvania to take a new job. Relying on numerous
cases that held that interstate commerce is impacted
when persons [*15] move between states to search for
employment (id. at p. 242, and cases cited therein), the
court concluded that there was no justification in forcing
people to chose between an out-of-state job and enjoying
the protections of the various statutes of limitations when
Ohio's long-arm statute provided jurisdiction over all
those alleged to have engaged in wrongful activity in the
state (ibid.).
We see no reason to depart from the views expressed
in Filet Menu. Dr. Medeiros, a former California
resident, moved to Texas to take a new job in 1998,
thereby engaging in interstate commerce. He has been
frilly amenable to service under California's long-arm
statute since that time. There is no sound basis for
imposing a burden on him that would not have been
imposed had he remained a California resident, or
forcing him to choose between a new job in a different
state and unlimited exposure to litigation arising from his
work in California. Under Bendix, section 351 cannot be
used to toll the otherwise applicable statute of
limitations.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
CURRY, J.
We concur:
EPSTEIN, J., Acting P.J.
HASTINGS, J.

